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 Links from his ammo belt and brass fl y as Sgt. Juan Morales, attached to 2nd Air Naval Gunfi re 
Liaison Company (ANGLICO), lays down a vicious barrage of gun fi re on insurgent positions to cover U.S. 
Marines movements while on patrol in the city of Ramadi.  The mission was part of the continuing sup-
port by ANGLICO to the 2nd Brigade Combat Team/28th Infantry Division (2/28th BCT).   2/28th BCT was 
deployed with 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF) in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in the Al 
Anbar Province to develop the Iraqi security forces, facilitate the development of offi  cial rule of law 
through democratic government reforms, and continue the development of a market-based economy 




 As we prosecute the current campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and the 
Philippines, the military must also prepare for an uncertain security situation beyond the present 
theaters of confl ict.  It is a future that will be heavily infl uenced by global competition for declin-
ing natural resources, rapidly rising populations in underprivileged and underdeveloped areas, 
unstable economic markets, and the continuing resurgence of violent religious and secular ideolo-
gies challenging democracy as a credible political theory.  Additionally, U.S. Force must account for 
the impact of rapid information transfer, porous national borders, globalization, increased indigent 
migrating populations with elevated expectations, and a proliferation of technologies associated 
with making and employing weapons of mass destruction.  
 To prepare for future contingencies in such a world, we must build capabilities that enable 
forces to rapidly adapt to crises emerging from unanticipated events.   “Rapidly adapting” in this 
context means acquiring the ability to quickly change not only weapons and the way we supply 
ourselves, but the way we think and train to deal with new challenges in unfamiliar circumstances.  
To deal with this security environment, we must cultivate a whole-government intra-service and 
interagency culture of fl exibility.
 It was for the purpose of enabling U.S. land forces to see more clearly, understand more 
readily, and transform more quickly that the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leav-
enworth, Kansas, and the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Center (MCCDC) at Quantico, 
Virginia, took action to jointly establish the Counterinsurgency Center (COIN Center), located at Fort 
Leavenworth in 2006.
 The information in this pamphlet outlines the COIN Center’s origin, current missions and 
purpose, and vision for the future.  The COIN Center is still a work in progress.  But it is one that is 
vitally needed to facilitate the development of a culture that enables us to more eff ectively adapt 
as a whole government when called upon to deal with future COIN or COIN-like threats.  
 
     
     DANIEL S. ROPER
     Colonel, Field Artillery




Graduates from the Iraqi Border Patrol Academy hoist US Marine Corps (USMC) Corporal (CPL) 
Horton, an instructor from their class, onto their shoulders in celebration after the class graduation 
ceremony during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Iraqi Border Patrol Academy was conducted at Al 
Asad, Iraq and taught by instructors working with the USMC II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF).
COIN Center
 In 2006, U. S. Army Combined Arms Center Commander, LTG David Petraeus, and the U.S. Ma-
rine Corps Combat Development Center (MCCDC) Commander Lt. Gen. James Mattis established the 
COIN Center in response to a need to better educate and train all U.S. ground forces on the principles 
and practices of counterinsurgency, and to better integrate COIN eff orts among the services.  To this 
end, the original COIN Center mandate was to “connect the dots” among the diverse operational ele-
ments to facilitate the implementation of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and the U.S. Marine 
Field Manual 3-24 (Counterinsurgency), and to foster integration of COIN eff orts among service com-
ponents preparing to deploy or already conducting COIN operations.  Though it continues to function 
under that original mandate, the COIN Center focus has expand its focus to sister services, the inter-
agency, and coalition partners dealing with COIN and broader COIN-like threats.              
 
Founders of COIN
LTG David Petraeus LTG James Mattis
------------------------
 “In the conventional war, military action, seconded by diplomacy, propaganda, and economic pressure, is 
generally the principal way to achieve the goal.  Politics as an instrument of war tends to take a back seat and emerges 
again—as an instrument—when the fi ghting ends….The picture is diff erent in the revolutionary war.  The objective be-
ing the population itself, the operations designed to win it over (for the insurgent) or to keep it at least submissive (for 
the counterinsurgent) are essentially of a political nature.  In this case, consequently, political action remains foremost 
throughout the war.  It is not enough for the government to set political goals, to determine how much military force is 
applicable, to enter into alliances or to break them; politics becomes an active instrument of operation.  And so intri-
cate is the interplay between the political and the military actions that they cannot be tidily separated; on the contrary, 
every military move has to be weighed with regard to its political  eff ects, and vice versa.” Counterinsurgency Warfare, 
Theory and Practice, by David Galula, Praeger Security International: Westport, Connecticut (2006 – First printed in 
1964) p. 66.




 While the development of a single military peer competitor is unlikely in the near term, 
we must be realistic about the challenges posed by less well-equipped hostile national, transna-
tional entities or coalitions/alliances that challenge traditional centers of power and leverage niche 
technologies.  We must also remain cognizant that a well-led and well-trained force can eff ectively 
challenge even the most advanced technology.  (The future of armed confl ict for the foreseeable 
future will likely be waged in densely populated multi-ethnic and multi-racial areas by belligerents 
who routinely employ a greater variety of elements of power than mere force as opposed to major 
conventional battles and engagements fought by national armies on battlefi elds devoid of popula-
tion.  
 In such confl icts, victory will be gauged diff erently than in wars past. Success will not by 
measured by the quantity of ground seized or the number of casualties infl icted or POWs captured. 
Victory will be measured by trust and support elicited from local populations and social order and 
stability established with minimum internal social oppression.  Progress in COIN confl icts will be 
measured in enhanced host nation competency, capacity, and legitimacy.  .How well a stable order 
that is both satisfactory to its people and no longer poses a threat will be the fi nal arbiter of suc-
cess.
 To prepare for future complex confl icts, a strategy that integrates joint, interagency and 
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U.S. Army Staff  Sgt. Kevin Nettnin conducts a dismounted patrol to assess the progress of security measures in the Al Dora 
market area of Baghdad, Iraq, 25 May 2007. Nettnin is from Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 2nd 
Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division. 
“In small wars, tolerance, sympathy and kindness should be the keynote to our relationship with the mass of the popu-
lation.” Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace,  (New York: Basic Books, 2002) 285. 
“In the fi rst place the army has got to provide units which are trained, organized and equipped to carry out the sort of 
operations given to them, and in the second it is responsible for producing properly educated commanders and staff  
offi  cers capable of advising the government and its various agencies at every level on how best to conduct the cam-
paign.  In this connection it is worth pointing out that as the enemy is likely to be employing a combination of politi-
cal, economic, psychological and military measures, so the government will have to do likewise to defeat him, and 
although an army offi  cer may regard the non-military action required as being the business of the civilian authori-
ties, they will regard it as being his business, because it is being used for operational reasons.  At every level the civil 
authorities will rightly expect the soldier to know how to use non-military forms of action as part of the operational 
plan, although once it has been decided to use a particular measure they will know how to put it into eff ect.”   Frank 
Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency & Peacekeeping,  Natraj Publishers: New Delhi, 1992) p. 7 
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Mission of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center
  The role of the COIN Center is to improve U.S. military counterinsurgency capabilities.  It is a 
collaborative “Land Service” activity that reports directly to its co-chairs - the Commanding Generals of 
the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) and the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Com-
mand.  The COIN Center provides assistance to Army/USMC components in implementation/ applica-
tion of the body of thought contained in FM 3-24 in order to improve US ground forces’ capability to 
operate in a full- spectrum- COIN environment.  It is also the primary focal point for CAC matters in-
volving COIN operations.  The COIN Center is staff ed with a cadre of knowledgeable Army and Marine 
Corps subject matter experts who have operational experience and academic education in counterin-
surgency operations.  It discharges its role using six lines of eff ort:
               • Doctrine Implementation and “Best Practice
                     Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)
               • Integration of COIN
               • Research
               • Advise Leaders and Organizations
               • Improve Education 
               • Outreach 
 
Afghan soldier fi res RPG at Taliban forces.
         Developing robust COIN capability within 
the military requires a proactive vice reactive 
approach – and investment now for future suc-
cess.  To that end, the COIN Center is a 
small investment with a big return.
   The COIN Center supports agencies and initiatives that span the spectrum from policy 
formation to tactical unit assistance. Involvement ranges from participation in efforts to 
formulate interagency and international doctrine at the policy level down to direct involve-
ment in the writing of doctrine for the Army/Marine Corps for use at the lowest tacti-
cal levels.  The unusual span of engagement refl ects the general character of COIN, the 
resolution of which involves a host of issues that no single Service or even combination 
of military Services is equipped and trained to deal with.  Such must be handled as com-
plex operations that require the participation by a wide spectrum of agencies both in and 
outside of the U.S. government.  As a consequence, COIN Center responsibilities demand 
close coordination with a broad range of organizations.         
COIN Center Engagement






• U.S. Government COIN  
• Interagency (IA) COIN  
   Initiative (ICI)
• Media Outreach
• Canada, United Kingdom,
   Australia Initiatives Strategic
   Communications / Outreach
• McCormick Foundation
• III Corps CAAT
• Joint Publication 3-24
• Monthly COIN Integration
  Meeting 
• Irregular Warfare Forum:
   Joint Forces Command 
   (JFCOM), Special Operations
   Command (SOCOM),
   U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marine 
   Corps
• FM 3-24.2
• COIN Handbook
• COIN Leader Workshop
• IED-Defeat Integrated 
  Capabilities Development
  Team (ICDT)
• Support to non-Brigade 
   Combat Teams
Near term Initiatives
•  Support to National Security
    Council (NSC)
• Offi ce of the Coordinator for
   Reconstruction and Stabilization
   (S/CRS), U.S. Agency for
   International Development
   (USAID), U.S. Department of 
   Treasury
• Project on National Security
   Reform (PNSR)
• Africa Command 
  (AFRICOM)
• Research
• Theater COIN Assessment, 
   Afghanistan
• COIN / Irregular Warfare (IW)
   Joint Integrating Concepts (JIC)
•  COIN Centers for Excellence
    Triad
    
• FM 3-24 Update & Conference
- Focused Research
• School of Command Preparation
   & School of  Advanced Military 
   Studies (SAMS)
• COIN Fellowship
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Go to http://coin.army.mil for the most up-to-date information
 Foreign Aff airs Minister Mr. Peter MacKay arrives at  Camp Nathan Smith, Kandahar Provincial Re-
construction Team (KPRT) for the dedication of the Glyn Berry Room.  The KPRT located at Camp Nathan 
Smith in the heart of Kandahar City is comprised of approximately 250 soldiers, drawn largely from Land 
Forces Western Area (LFWA) and 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1 CMBG) based in Shilo, Mani-
toba and Edmonton, Alberta.  Task Force Afghanistan is part of Canada’s contribution to the Islamic Re-
public of Afghanistan.  Canadians and their international partners are helping Afghan people to rebuild 
their lives, their families, their communities and their nation.  The mission is to improve the quality of life 
of Afghan people by providing a secure environment in which Afghan society can recover from more 




 Coordination and collaboration with other institutions involved in counterinsurgency issues 
(senior service colleges, theater COIN academies, schools and centers) ensures a consistency of doc-
trine, training, and education. It also promotes awareness of future trends and projections for the 
contemporary operational environment; underscores the importance of understanding the nature of 
insurgencies and the need to develop eff ective counterinsurgency strategies supported by appropriate 
DOTMLPF capabilities. 
 • Monthly secure Video Teleconferences with stakeholders
  o       Theater COIN “Centers for Excellence” (CFE)
  o      Combat Training Centers
  o      Service Irregular Warfare Centers
  o      1st Army
  o      CAC Organizations
 • Interagency Collaboration
 Historic  and recent experience has shown that a whole government approach to COIN is vital 
for success.  COIN and COIN-like confl icts have a host of subtle dimensions that must be addressed by 
other than military means, but which the military must understand, appreciate, and incorporate into 
operationally planning without prejudice.   Much of what needs to be done in COIN environments lies 
in the realm of public diplomacy and reconstruction conducted by non-military agencies.
9
A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT MISSION....
 Some past practitioners of COIN have asserted that a COIN confl ict is 80% political and 
20% military.  Though this estimated ratio cannot be mathematically confi rmed, the comments 
of a large number of veterans verify that something like that proportional distribution of em-
phasis does exist.  Most returning Commanders and other Soldiers have asserted that most of 
what they found themselves doing in their COIN experience was non-military in a conventional 
sense, but also vitally necessary. 
 Moreover, many critics of the current war’s management have noted that the main 
burden for such non-military activities has fallen on the military in areas well outside its tra-
ditional areas of expertise in such roles as public diplomacy, and carrying the main burden of 
reconstruction and provision of aid.  This latter observation signals  that there is a great deal to 
be done to rectify misdistribution of responsibility with the U.S. government for COIN, which 
in large measure remains a key defi ciency in our national ability to eff ectively prosecute COIN 
confl icts.  The  analytical construct the COIN Center uses for continued analysis of distributed 
responsibility for issues in a COIN environment is the acronym “DDD” or the “3Ds”:  Diplomacy 










How we tend to view things How the insurgent views things
The Challenge to the Way We Think
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 To deal competitively with adversaries we face in similar situations in the future, the 
U.S. must have exercised and seasoned collaborative partnerships within the interagency 
with support from the best and brightest drawn from not only government but private sec-
tor industry and academia.  Successful COIN will require a myriad of cultural lenses to 
understand the perceptions of all the stakeholders. The challenge is understanding how 
factors relate and infl uence each other – an adaptive system of systems.  Preparing for such 
confl icts will require greatly increased sophistication in distinguishing between solving the 
problems we can solve versus the problems we should solve. 
 However, such collaborative relationships will take time to develop.  That said, in an 
area of persistent confl ict, preparation for dealing with determined enemies who rely on 
asymmetric approaches to attacking the U.S. and its interests requires a proactive approach 
now, not a knee jerk reaction amidst the confusion and frustration of some future crises. 
 Consequently, one of the chief objectives and purposes of the COIN Center is to work 
towards establishing and institutionalizing an interagency planning framework that promotes 
intellectual collaboration across a range of agencies both within as well as outside of gov-
ernment.  To this end, it is seeking to establish relationships and identify opportunities for 
collaboration with experts from the military, U.S. government, academic, and private sector 
to ensure the development of well thought out solutions.  
HADITHA, Iraq-Samir Mifl ih Hamid, a local program manager in Haditha, Iraq, speaks with 
members of the Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team and US Agency for Interna-
tional Development in a newly refurbished technical school Monday. The ePRT and USAID 
members have funded more than $2 million in projects since February in efforts to rebuild 
Iraq. The technical school will offer machinery and mechanical classes to both men and 
women once completed. , Cpl. Shawn Coolman, USMC
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Service Centers
• USA & USMC COIN CENTER
• USAF Irregular Warfare Center
• USMC Irregular Warfare Center
• U.S. SOCOM J10
• U.S. JFCOM IW Center
COIN Centers for Excellence
• Camp Taji, Iraq
• Camp Phoenix, Afghanistan
Combat Training Centers
• National Training Center (NTC)
• 29 Palms (Marine)
• Joint Warfi ghting Center (JWFC)
• Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)






• U.S. Military Academy (USMA)
• John Hopkins University
• Kansas State University
• University of Kansas
• University of Alabama
• Pritzker Military Library
• Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute   
   (PKSOI)






• Land Warfare Center, United Kingdom
• NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, 
   Netherlands
Media
• Wall Street Journal
• Chicago Tribune





• U.S. Institute for Peace 
   (USIP)
• McCormick Foundation
Outreach
  The Coin Center establishes and maintains professional, collaborative relationships 
with joint, interagency, multinational, educational, intellectual, research, media, nongov-
ernmental, and international organizations that have a professional interest in COIN to 
foster a better understanding of insurgencies and how to counter them effectively.  Main-
tains connections with COIN centers for excellence in Afghanistan and Iraq in support of 
campaign planning.  Sponsor/participate in COIN conferences.
 •    Sponsor COIN symposia
 •    Participation in Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO)
 •    Maintains public and internal working webpages
  o    http://www.coin.army.mil
  o    https:// www.combinedarmscenter.army.mil/SO/COIN/default.aspx
 •   Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) COIN Forum
 •   Sponsors professional writing for publication on COIN topics
 •   Partnership with academia and think tanks
 •   Media
COL Daniel Roper, Director of the USA/
USMC COIN Center, participating in a 
forum about the “War on Terror” at the 
Pritzker Military Library’s Front & Center 
with John Callaway (January 31, 2008)
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“This is a democracy, and a free press is the fundamental underpinning of every-
thing that we stand for, fi ght for, and believe in. Now, it doesn’t make any difference 
then whether you like the media or you don’t like the media, they’re here to stay. It 
is healthy for the American military to be exposed through the media to the public. 
After all, they pay our salaries. The American people need to know what  happens in 
war. Perhaps if more people understood the horror, we would be less inclined to go 
to war.” USMC General Walter Boomer, “Stop Whining” Proceedings (July 1998).
“It was the ethical in war, and the process on which the command mainly depended 
for victory on the Arab front. The printing press is the greatest weapon in the ar-
moury of the modern commander, and the commanders of the Arab army being ama-
teurs in the art, began their war in the atmosphere of the 20th century, and thought 
of their weapons without prejudice, not distinguishing one from another socially.”
T.E. Lawrence, Fourteenth Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, 1929.
Doctrine
 COIN Doctrine Implementation and promulgation of “Best Practice” COIN Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)
 The COIN Center aims to promote, within the military and the interagency, a mas-
tery of COIN operations by providing subject matter expertise to organizations integrat-
ing COIN doctrine in training and education curricula; and facilitating promulgation of 
state-of-the-art COIN material through discussions, dissemination through writing and 
on-line web portal exchange, and distribution through other media.
 •    Strategic-level
        o Contributor to U.S. Government Senior Leader Guide to Counterinsurgency
              •  Operational-level
        o Partner with Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) in writing 
           JP 3-24


















Scope: U.S. Joint Forces 




















 o    Proponent for COIN Leaders Handbook
 o    Partner with U.S. Army Infantry School in writing 
       FMI 3-24.2 (Tactics in COIN)
FM 3-24/ MCWP 3-33.5
Level: Operational/ Tactical













Scope: BN-below US Ground Forces
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 As with any other profession dealing with a specifi c common challenge, the military needs the 
best and brightest minds to research, analyze, debate, and publish their conclusions to expand the COIN 
professional body of knowledge upon which doctrine is written, training developed, and operational 
planning is based.  Moreover, such knowledge together with the source material from which it was drawn 
must be appropriately preserved, distributed, and archived to ensure knowledge of COIN “best practices” 
is preserved for the future after the institutional memory has faded.  It is only through archiving objective 
research that we can come to reliably anticipate the requirements for eff ectively preparing for and ad-
equately resourcing future contingencies.  
Research
 To the above end, the Director of COIN serves as a member of the Combined Arms Center Execu-
tive Editorial Board that develops the Commanding General’s priority research list. In addition, the COIN 
Center participates in activities conducting research including:
•     SAIC DOTMLPF study
 •     Doctrine, Organization, Training, DOTMLPF Gap Analysis
 •     Theater visits
 •     Collection and dissemination of unit deployment preparation lessons learned
 Writing for Professional Publication
 Additionally, the COIN Center sponsors and mentors researchers doing monograph and master’s 
thesis work on COIN issues, COIN capability assessments, and best practices from operational theaters to 
identify gaps across the DOTMLPF.  These include:
 • Sponsorship/Mentorship of COIN-related Monographs
  o  SAMS
  o  MMAS
  o  War College KSIL topics
 • Partnership with and/or  assistance to members of:
  o  Academia
  o  Think Tanks
  o  Media projects
18
 THE COLLOQUIUM
   To provide an additional avenue for authors to publish their research, the COIN Center also 
maintains an on-line electronic journal named the COIN COLLOQUIUM .  This on-line journal is 
linked to a discussion board which enables readers of the articles published to make comments 
or provide additional contributions to expand the knowledge pertaining to the subject of each 
topic addressed in articles.
Subscribers to the COIN Research page are off ered the opportunity to suggest topics for  re-
search, provide research work to the COIN Center for consideration of publication, and publish 
articles on the COIN website.
    Additionally, the COIN Center directly assists a limited number of scholars with projects of 






  Acts as a COIN consultant to training centers, and to leader development and 
training programs.
 • Quarterly assistance visits to Combat Training Centers (CTC)
  o  National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California
  o  Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana
  o  Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), 
           Fort  Irwin, California
 •  Leader Workshops – 2 and 5 day courses
 •  Provide land force representative to Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO)
 •  Provide support to school-houses and training/curriculum developers
COL David Maxwell, former Commander of the Philippines Joint Special Operations Task Force 
(JSTOF) provides a detailed lessons-learned briefi ng to students during the U.S. Army/U.S. 
Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Leader Workshop, 12 Aug 2008.  Maxwell is currently the G-3 
of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC. The workshop was held at the 
Battle Command Training Center (BCTC) from 11-14 August with more than 90 students at-
tending.
21
U.S. Army Spc. Chris Avila (right) and other soldiers engage Taliban forces during a halt to repair a 
disabled vehicle near the village of Allah Say, Afghanistan, on Aug. 20, 2007. Avila is assigned to 
Foxtrot Company, 2nd Battalion, 82nd Aviation Brigade. 
DoD photo by Staff Sgt. Michael L. Casteel, U.S. Army. (Released)
--------------------------
“In modern warfare, we are not actually grappling with an army organized along traditional lines, but 
with a few armed elements acting clandestinely within a population manipulated by a special organiza-
tion….In seeking a solution, it is essential to realize that in modern warfare we are not up against just 
a few armed bands spread across the territory, but rather against an armed clandestine organization 
whose essential role is to impose its will upon the population.  Victory will be obtained only through the 
complete destruction of that organization.  This is the master concept that must guide us in our study of 
modern warfare.” Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare A French View of Counterinsurgency, (Praeger Secu-
rity International: Connecticut, 2006) 7.
“If the enemy comes out to fi ght he will be met with a disciplined lethal ferocity he has never before 
endured. If he plays the sly game of intimidating, beheading and torturing the innocent people of Iraq 
when he thinks we’re not looking, he will be met with a cunning, a sophistication and a relentlessness 
that will lead to his utter defeat.  This is my promise to you as your commander and from all of us to our 
honored dead.” LTC Rod Coffey, Commander, 3rd Squadron, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment, The “Wolf-























Clearly, the global security environment is changing.  Much of this change 
points to a future shaped by mounting stress and volatility from failing or radical-
ized states in the developing world fueled by great misery and popular dissatis-
faction due to the competition for resources produced by explosive birthrates and 
shrinking resources.  Solutions to the problems that grow out of such conditions 
will demand greater international cooperation as well as more effi cient and syn-
chronized cooperation among U.S. agencies at large to stop the emergence of in-
surgencies before they take root.  The COIN Center is at the heart of examining 
and analyzing such a future, and helping the Nation and its allies to prepare for 
successful steps for dealing with it.
Improve Education
 Adjusting to the COIN challenge has not been easy for either the U.S. military or the U.S. gov-
ernment.  In many ways, the modern COIN threat is a product of globalization where greater ease of 
transportation, more porous national borders, fundraising, recruitment eff orts, public diplomacy, and 
propaganda by insurgents over the Internet have made insurgencies transnational in ways that are en-
tirely new.  Dealing eff ectively with COIN requires a signifi cant change in mindset. Among the priority 
objectives of the COIN Center is to assist the Army and Marine Corps to incorporate and assimilate the 
body of knowledge outlined in FM 3-24 (Counterinsurgency).  Additionally, the COIN Center is playing 
a key role in driving the next evolution of FM 3-24 as experience generates greater understanding of 
insurgency in the 21st Century.  The COIN Center is also a key sponsor of an entirely new addition to 
the military Field Manual library – FM 3-24.2 (Tactical Counterinsurgency).  Publication of this FM will 
provide COIN guidance tailored to battalions and below.   
  Upon request, the COIN Center provides seminars and workshops to assist training centers 
and unit leadership in the development of their COIN-indoctrination programs.  The focus of such 
programs is to help shift the mindset of leaders, trainers, staff s, and Soldiers from conventional ap-
proaches to understanding and planning for confl ict to ways that will enable participants to think and 
fi ght unconventionally in a COIN environment.  the COIN center also provides educational expertise to 
Command & General Staff  College, School of Advanced Military Studies, and Primary Care Clinic as they 
integrate COIN instruction into their curricula.
 Investment in leader development and education is among the most important actions in 
preparing for future confl ict .  COIN requires deep and detailed context- and culture-specifi c under-
standing of local and regional conditions.  Success requires leaders who can eff ectively understand 
their environment and the impact of their actions on that environment.  Consequently, COIN leaders 
must learn to be both critical thinkers and innovative problem solvers that focus on “how” to think 
when confronting new and unfamiliar challenges rather than relying on rote memorization of “what” 
to think.
23
     Additionally, for the U.S. to realistically deal with the most likely security threats of the future, 
COIN instruction must be integrated into Army and Marine leadership training at every level. Those 
who lead in COIN confl icts must be trained to be “Balanced Warriors,” capable of leading in mul-
tiple environments without necessarily striving to be multi-skilled in every dimension.  Producing 
leaders who have been taught to be culturally attuned, as well as skillful and adaptable organiz-
ers, trainers, and leaders is the goal.  Consequently, training, leader development, and education 
must increasingly focus on how to think about the environment in which a leader’s unit is to oper-
ate in and determine what must be done to most eff ectively infl uence the actors who inhabit that 
environment.   Moreover, such COIN training must in some way be standardized in order to align 
methods and approaches across institutions to ensure progressive and sequential training as units 
prepare to deploy.
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John Jeans, of the Inma Agribusiness Program, and Navy Cmdr. Kevin Anderson inspect a lettuce 
fi eld in Ramadi, Iraq, as part of the effort to revive agribusiness in Anbar Province. 
Photo courtesy of Inma Agribusiness Program
---------------------------------
“One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that 
military success is not suffi cient to win: economic development, institution-build-
ing and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, pro-
viding basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and 
police forces, strategic communications, and more – these, along with security, 
are essential ingredients for long-term success.”  Secretary of Defense Robert M. 
Gates, 26 Nov 07, Landon Lecture, Kansas State University.
  A Marine with the 3rd Mobile Assault Platoon, Weapons Company, 3rd Battalion, 6th 
Marine Regiment, overlooks the open desert south of the town of Ubaydi, Iraq, Sept. 21, 2005, in 
western Al Anbar Province.  Marines and Iraqi Soldiers conducted a fi ve-day counterinsurgency 
operation in Ubaydi, a former insurgent stronghold about 15 miles from the Syrian border.  After 
spending seven months of routing out insurgents and stabilizing the Al Qa’im region, located 
along the Euphrates River in northwestern Al Anbar Province near the Syrian border, the Camp 
Lejeune, N.C.-based Marines say they’re leaving the region in better shape then when they ar-
rived last year. During the past seven months, the Marines have brought stability back to the 
people of western Iraq by training Iraqi Army Soldiers and ridding the region of anti-Iraqi forces, 
thanks to an aggressive counterinsurgency campaign, which included Operation Steel Curtain 
in November 2005 - a major off ensive to disrupt insurgent activity along the Syrian border 
which saw hundreds of insurgents killed or captured.   “We’re able to progress now with getting 
consistent (electrical) power, free and clean running water for all the villages up there, as well 
as starting to rebuild the hospitals and the schoolhouses that have suff ered over the last three 
years,” said Col. Stephen W. Davis, who commanded all Marine forces in western Al Anbar Prov-
ince for the past year, during a Pentagon press briefi ng last month. 
(Offi  cial U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Jerad W. Alexander)  
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AN ENDURING MISSION....
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